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► Black and white visual patterns activate a dichotomous construct of right vs. wrong.
► Visual contrast primes a speciﬁc mindset that leads to polarized moral judgments.
► Non-affective, perceptual experiences can shape moral judgment.
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Recent research has emphasized the role of intuitive processes in morality by documenting the link between
affect andmoral judgment. The present research testedwhether incidental visual cueswithout any affective con-
notation can similarly shape moral judgment by priming a certain mindset. In two experiments we showed that
exposure to an incidental black andwhite visual contrast leads people to think in a “black andwhite”manner, as
indicated by more extreme moral judgments. Participants who were primed with a black and white checkered
background while considering a moral dilemma (Experiment 1) or a series of social issues (Experiment 2)
gave ratings thatwere signiﬁcantly further from the response scale'smid-point, relative to participants in control
conditions without such priming. These ﬁndings suggest that in addition to affective cues and gut feelings,
non-affective cues relating to processing style can inﬂuence moral judgments.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The factors behind people's ability to tell right fromwrong have been
the topic of intensive scientiﬁc investigation. Whereas early approaches
such as Kohlberg's work on the development of moral reasoning as-
sumed that rational thinking is the sole determinant of people's moral
decisions (e.g., Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983), more recent efforts
have focused on non-rational processes as primary factors formoral con-
siderations. In particular, Haidt (2001) proposed the Social Intuitionist
Model, based on which automatic intuitive processes inﬂuence people's
moral judgment outside of conscious awareness. According to this
model, people form moral judgments based on gut feelings and it is
only subsequently that they generate reasons to justify these judgments.
Research on such intuitive factors that shape moral judgment has
largely focused on the role of affect. Indeed, a growing body of research
suggests that experimental manipulations of physical disgust inﬂuence
people's judgments of moral disgust (e.g., Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz,
2011; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).
For example, participants exposed to a foul, disgusting smell considered
moral transgressions such as lying or stealing as more wrong than par-
ticipants who are not exposed to such a smell (Schnall, Benton, &
Harvey, 2008). Further, morally objectionable behaviors elicit a facial
disgust response that is identical to the one exhibited when being
confronted with physically disgusting stimuli, including a bitter tasting
drink, or photos of mutilated bodies (Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011;
Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009), and there is some evi-
dence suggesting that similar brain structures are involved in the expe-
rience of both physical disgust andmoral condemnation (e.g., Moll et al.,
2005).
Thus, accumulating evidence indicates that incidental feelings of dis-
gust can change moral judgments. However, the more general claim of
the social intuitionist model, that various kinds of automatically
processed cues can inﬂuence moral judgment, has not been examined.
The present research explored such a link by presenting participants
with visual cues that involved a potential moral connotation in the ab-
sence of any affective valence.
Previous work has established that people associate certain colors
with notions of morality. In professional sports, players wearing black
uniforms are perceived as more aggressive and they are sanctioned
more often in the form of penalties, compared to players whowear uni-
forms in other colors (Gilovich & Frank, 1988). Further, Sherman and
Clore (2009) demonstrated that the color white is associated with pos-
itive moral value, whereas the color black is associated with negative
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moral value. In a Stroop task participants were faster to name the color
of morality-related words printed in white font, but they were faster to
name the color of immorality-related words printed in black font. This
research demonstrated an inherent association of color and moral
meaning.What has not been established, however, is whether other as-
pects of colormight literally “color”moral judgments, but through a dif-
ferentmechanism, namely by priming a speciﬁcmindset, rather than by
providing an association.
One such mindset involves the contrast of black and white, which
is commonly depicted in visual images (e.g., the Yin–Yang symbol)
and verbal metaphors (e.g., “black and white” thinking) to represent
distinctions of good and bad and other conceptual dichotomies. We
hypothesized that the incidental exposure to a black and white visual
contrast should prime a speciﬁc mindset, namely “black and white”
thinking, and therefore lead to more polarized moral judgments, rel-
ative to a neutral visual background.
Experiment 1
Participants were asked to respond to the classic moral dilemma de-
veloped by Kohlberg et al. (1983). It describes the situation of a man
called Heinz whose wife is dying of cancer. Because the pharmacist
who sells the life-saving drug charges more than Heinz can afford, the
latter decides to steal the drug. Thus, the scenario can either be consid-
ered asHeinz following a praiseworthymoral imperative, namely saving
a life, or as him committing a crime, namely stealing precious goods
from another person.
Because previous research has established that a speciﬁcmindset can
be primed by providing participants with concepts related to a given
processing style (e.g., Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; for a re-
view, see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), we activated ametaphor associated
with taking an extreme point of view, namely “black and white” think-
ing. For participants in the experimental condition the Heinz dilemma
was presented on a black and white checkered background, whereas
for participants in the control condition it was presented on a uniformly
gray background. To control for the potential confoundof visual contrast
irrespective of moral connotation, a second control group received the
dilemma on a blue and yellow checkered background.We hypothesized
that participants primedwith a black and white mindset should adopt a
more binaryway of thinkingwhen asked to indicate how right orwrong
the behavior of the protagonist was; in other words, theywere expected
to exhibit more extreme judgments to either side of the response scale,
relative to participants in the control conditions.
Method
Participants
One hundred-eleven visitors to a psychology-research website
(mean age=28.15 years, SD=12.11, 67 female) volunteered for a
study on decision making.
Materials and procedure
Participants were presented with the Heinz dilemma and rated
their approval or disapproval of him stealing the drug on a scale
from 1 (=right) to 7 (=wrong). Only this one item was presented
to participants; no other dependent variables were included. Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions, and
saw the stimuli as depicted in Fig. 1.
Results and discussion
To assess judgment polarization, we computed a deviation score
corresponding to each rating's absolute distance from the scale's mid-
point “4”. Results revealed that mean deviation scores differed signiﬁ-
cantly among conditions, F(2, 108)=4.24, p=.02, ηp2=.07. Planned
comparisons showed that, as expected, participants in the black and
white condition (M=1.73, SD=.87) gave ratings thatwere signiﬁcant-
ly further from the scale's midpoint, compared to participants in the
gray condition (M=1.22, SD=1.00), F(1, 108)=5.38, p=.02, or the
blue and yellow condition (M=1.14, SD=.98), F(1, 108)=7.22, p=
.008. Further, there was no difference between the gray and the blue
and yellow condition, F(1, 108)=0.13, p=.71.
As expected, although conditions differed in how polarized their
moral judgments were, conditions did not differ in overall judgment se-
verity (black and white condition:M=3.51, SD=1.90; gray condition:
M=3.54, SD=1.52; blue and yellow condition, M=3.24, SD=1.30),
F(2, 108)=0.40, p=.67. In other words, the judgment polarization in
the black and white condition was bidirectional, which left the overall
mean rating unaffected. To conclude, theﬁndings from Experiment 1 in-
dicate that priming participants with a visual contrast relating to judg-
ment extremity led to more extreme judgments, relative to the two
control conditions.
Experiment 2
Previous research has shown that abstract social issues in the ab-
sence of any detailed description of a speciﬁc conﬂict or dilemma can
be considered moral issues (Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010). To
replicate and extend the ﬁndings fromExperiment 1 to othermoral con-
cerns, in this experiment we asked participants to respond to a series of
social issues while being exposed to a black and white, or a neutral gray
background. As in Experiment 1, we predicted that being primed with
the visual contrast of black andwhite should lead tomore extreme judg-
ments than receiving no such priming.
Method
Participants
One hundred-thirty individuals (mean age=28.42, SD=11.36, 73
female) participated in a survey on social issues in exchange for
15 cents as payment. Participants were recruited through Amazon's
Mechanical Turk, an online marketplace where people complete cogni-
tive tasks. Recent research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) has
shown that this method of conducting online experiments provides
high quality data that are at least as reliable as those obtained through
more traditional data-collection methods.
Materials and procedure
Participants rated the morality of six social issues (pornography,
adultery, using drugs, littering, smoking and use of profane language)
as used by Zhong et al. (2010) on a scale from −5 (=very immoral)
to +5 (=very moral). Only these six items were presented to partici-
pants; no other dependent variables were included. The social issues
were presented one at a time, in a random order, and half the partici-
pants viewed themdisplayed against a black andwhite checkered back-
ground, whereas the other half viewed them against a uniform gray
background.
Results and discussion
Consistent with the results of Experiment 1, the mean deviation of
judgments from the scale's midpoint was greater in the black and
white condition (M=2.50, SD=.96) than in the gray condition
(M=2.05, SD=.91), F(1, 128)=7.35, p=.008, ηp2=.05. When
analyzed individually, all six items showed this same general pattern
(Fig. 2). Signiﬁcant main effects for priming condition were obtained
for smoking, F(1, 128)=5.69, p=.02, ηp2=.04, using drugs, F(1, 128)=
4.31, p=.04, ηp2=.03, and adultery, F(1, 128)=8.34, p=.005, ηp2=.06.
Mean severity ratings did not differ between conditions (black and
white condition: M=−1.79, SD=1.57; gray condition: M=−1.53,
SD=1.32), F(1, 128)=1.05, p=.31. Unlike in Experiment 1 that used
a moral dilemma designed to elicit both right and wrong responses,
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the items in Experiment 2 were mostly on the wrong side of morality,
designed to elicit negative responses. One might therefore expect a dif-
ference in mean severity ratings. However, a sizeable number of partic-
ipants gave positive and/or zero responses to one or more of the six
items. We identiﬁed 39 participants who gave at least one positively
biased rating. Although when comparing them there was no signiﬁcant
effect of condition, F(1, 37)=.39, p=.54, means were in the predicted
direction (black and white condition:M=2.53, SD=1.07; gray condi-
tion: M=2.32, SD=.96) and there was a small effect size (ηp2=.01),
revealing a small trend for positive scores to be polarized in the black
Fig. 1. Priming manipulations used in Experiment 1: (A) black and white, (B) gray, and (C) blue and yellow.
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and white condition. As expected, the analogous analysis for negative
scores yielded a signiﬁcant effect of condition (black and white
condition: M=−3.05, SD=.94; gray condition:M=−2.66, SD=.86),
F(1, 128)=6.1, p=.02, ηp2=.05. Further, the frequency of zeros for
any of the six items was lower in the black and white condition (67
zeros) than the gray condition (88 zeros). Indeed, an analysis conducted
on mean zero responses for each participant revealed a marginally sig-
niﬁcant effect of condition (black and white condition: M=1.02, SD=
1.02; gray condition: M=1.38, SD=1.23), F(1, 128)=3.33, p=.07,
ηp2=.03, supporting our initial hypothesis that participants in the gray
condition would score more toward the midpoint of the response
scale compared to participants in the black and white condition.
General discussion
Two experiments provided converging evidence that incidental vi-
sual experiences relating to color contrast can inﬂuence moral judg-
ment. Priming participants with a black and white background while
considering a moral dilemma (Experiment 1) or a series of social issues
(Experiment 2) resulted in them making judgments in a “black and
white” and therefore extreme manner, by selecting response options
closer toward the scale's end points.
These ﬁndings demonstrate a further connection between percep-
tions of color and notions of morality (Gilovich & Frank, 1988; Sherman
& Clore, 2009). People not only hold strong associations between certain
colors and notions of morality but they also use a given kind of mindset
implied in perceptual cues when they form a moral judgment. Thus,
our ﬁndings advance existing theoretical approaches of morality by
showing that not only affect (e.g., Chapman et al., 2009; Schnall, Haidt,
Clore & Jordan, 2008) but also perceptual experiences shape automatic
intuitions that inﬂuence moral judgments. These ﬁndings are thus in
line with Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model, and its key contention
that various kinds of intuitive inﬂuences – whether affective or not –
can have an inﬂuence on judgments of morality independently of delib-
erate reasoning.
An early study tested priming effects on moral reasoning (La Rue &
Olejnik, 1980) by inducing either a relatively basic reasoning style relat-
ing to concrete operations (cf. Piaget, 1928), or amore advanced reason-
ing style relating to formal operations. When indicating their reasons of
agreement with a decision in a moral dilemma, participants who had
ﬁrst engaged in formal operations requiring propositional thought listed
more items showed more “advanced” reasoning consistent with a
higher stage ofmoral thought according to Kohlberg (1976) than partic-
ipants who had only engaged in concrete operations. This ﬁnding was
interpreted to demonstrate that appropriate instruction can lead to a
sophisticated moral reasoning style that was previously only latent,
but not expressed. In other words, participants were able to stretch
their moral reasoning abilities and make more advanced responses
and draw upon information relevant to the speciﬁc moral dilemma. In
contrast, in our studies the priming involved presenting incidental per-
ceptual cues that were entirely irrelevant to the moral judgment
situation.
The reported ﬁndings support approaches of embodied cognition
that propose a central role ofmetaphor and language in cognitive repre-
sentations (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; for a review, see Landau, Meier, &
Keefer, 2010). Indeed, evidence has been accumulating that physical ex-
periences such as cleanliness (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Schnall, Benton, &
Harvey, 2008; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), warmth (IJzerman & Semin,
2009; Williams & Bargh, 2008) and weight (Jostmann, Lakens, &
Schubert, 2009) are closely linked to speciﬁc abstract concepts. Howev-
er, whereas such associations might be direct and based on the content
of bodily experience, our ﬁndings involve idiomized linguistic expres-
sions that most speakers of English would be familiar with, but which
do not necessarily reﬂect a clear physical basis.
Our results indicate that the effect of the black and white metaphor
was not driven solely by contrast because there was no comparable ef-
fect for the blue and yellow contrast condition. Instead, there appears
to be a speciﬁc metaphoric connotation of black vs. white that relates
to judgment extremity. One remaining question therefore is whether
such metaphoric links might be speciﬁc to morality, or extend to other
judgment contexts as well. On the one hand, the distinction between
light and dark is so fundamental that most languages include different
words for black and white even if they have no other color words
(Berlin &Kay, 1969). Thiswould suggest that themetaphor haswide ap-
plicability to a range of concepts (e.g., esthetic judgments), and might
possibly constitute a “basic” metaphor (Schnall, in press). On the other
hand, it is conceivable that our ﬁndings are speciﬁc to morality because
they relate to one of the presumedmoral foundations (Graham,Haidt, &
Nosek, 2009), namely purity. Indeed, compared to people low in disgust
sensitivity, people high in disgust sensitivity not only holdmore conser-
vative attitudes towardmoral issues (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012),
they are also better at visually detecting slight deviations from white
that might be indicative of contamination (Sherman, Haidt, & Clore, in
press). Thus, it is conceivable that a black andwhite visual contrast is es-
pecially salient in moral contexts.
The fact that subtle presentations of idiomized metaphors can
changewhich actions people consider right orwrong could have impor-
tant practical and applied implications. Indeed, there is a growing rec-
ognition that embodied physical experiences and resulting cognitive
processes might be intimately tied to abstract thinking and decision
Fig. 2. Mean deviation of participants' judgments from the scale's midpoint (Experiment 2). Error bars represent standard error.
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making in legal situations (e.g., Benforado, 2010; Spellman & Schnall,
2009). The observed association between perceptual experiences and
notions of morality might, for example, be particularly problematic in
contexts that involve judgments of others' guilt, or innocence: Subtle
perceptual stimuli in the courtroom context (e.g. the color of ﬂoor til-
ing) might unconsciously inﬂuence legal actors, leading to biased judg-
ments and decisions when objectivity is of utmost concern. The
knowledge about the existence of such factors might constitute the
ﬁrst step toward guarding against their potential inﬂuence.
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